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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 06-1279
________________
MARK M. MURAWSKI,
Appellant
v.
HONORABLE JUDGE
CYNTHIA A. BALDWIN
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-01255)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 27, 2006
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  December 20, 2006)
________________
OPINION
________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Mark M. Murawski, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment of
the District Court dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  For the
2reasons that follow, we will affirm.
In September of 2005, Appellant filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Honorable Cynthia A. Baldwin
of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.  According to Appellant, while
presiding over a civil action regarding a dispute over an easement for the use of
Appellant’s property, Judge Baldwin inserted the word “perpetual” into the terms of the
easement in violation of the settlement actually agreed to by the parties involved. 
Appellant alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by this action, and seeks
relief from the consent order of October 24, 2001, and an unspecified amount of monetary
damages from Appellee for loss of property and reputation.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review
the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d
229, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2004).  
The District Court held that, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it lacked
appellate authority over the decision of the state court that Appellant sought relief from. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (only United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
decisions of state courts); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983).  Because
Appellant was essentially asking the District Court to invalidate the state court’s consent
order, the Court held that his complaint was barred by Rooker-Feldman.  See id.; see also
E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1091 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “to grant [Appellant]
    1 Appellant’s Motion for Remedy and for Relief of Legislation is denied.
3
relief would require an inferior federal court to determine that the [state] court’s judgment
was erroneous and would foreclose implementation of that judgment”).  To the extent that
the District Court held that Appellant’s request for relief from the consent order was
barred by Rooker-Feldman, we agree.
In his complaint, Appellant also sought unspecified monetary damages from Judge
Baldwin.  The District Court did not reach this claim, holding instead that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the entire complaint.  Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute
that judges are immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction.  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).  As entry of the consent order
was plainly within Judge Baldwin’s jurisdiction, Appellant’s claim for damages could not
survive a motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.1
